Abstract
There is a fear that in training teachers for facilitating community of inquiry, we are "stressing the procedural to the exclusion of the substantive." It will be argued however that we do indeed "make progress." This key term, 'progress in learning', will be examined to show that progress in learning comes as content, process, attitude and affectivity. Because we practise an heuristic pedagogy, these outcomes may not be neatly encapsulated as predetermined Outcomes as that term is used in current curriculum writing parlance.
Introduction
My paper at the last FAPCA conference (Smith, 2000) outlined some markers with which to assess maturity in the growth of the community of inquiry. At that time, I offered a framework for educators to trial in their schools. Now I take up that discussion again, to review and evaluate those markers two years later.
Now in 2002, I have moved to focus on one detail in that framework in the light of Queensland's Productive Pedagogies, the issue of outcomes. Splitter and Sharp (1995: 141) in asking "what have they learned?" express the fear that we are training technicians, who are teachers expert in a shell of process but lacking in philosophical content, that Level 1 training stresses the procedural to the exclusion of the substantive. That same concern is alluded to again by Burgh and O'Brien (2002: 47) when they warn against the "overuse of procedural questioning, and a reluctance on the part of the teacher to be more involved in the substantive aspects of the inquiry." Now, as subject committees lay out their Outcomes-based syllabuses side by side, Philosophy needs to declare its outcomes in the content boxes. So this paper will focus on the issue of recognising and valuing progress in learning in our classroom communities of inquiry.
Our commitment to the community of inquiry is based on the wisdom that the group inquiry can be successful in a number of ways for generating and finding a collective wisdom. This paper will argue that one of the key features of the teacher's role in it is to engender, identify and acknowledge significant shifts or 'break-throughs' achieved there. It will explore some dynamics for recognising student achievements, and evaluate some effects these will have on the students and the community-building process as a whole.
Explicating the Problem
To begin, the question could be put: Are not the outcomes of discussions, even community of inquiry interactions, predictable and predicted either in the lesson plan aims or in the expressed Outcomes to which they are directed? Are not general group agreements in the community of inquiry with children too often just uneasy compromises or hybrids of social accommodations, or limited points of view or reassertions of dominant perspectives? Community of inquiry needs to show that it is a productive pedagogy (Smith 2002), that its dialogue is not just conversation but is indeed directional, that it is a productive pedagogy for being reflective dialogue. In short, it should be patently yielding 'progress in learning' towards what is new for the children.
We claim that our classroom discussions with children (which we observe can be loaded with anecdotes or everyday observations) are more than opportunities for sharing conventional views or organised exercises in social etiquette, or practice in newer and better forms of social control? We claim that doing philosophy in community of inquiry is different from the processes of study in other subjects. Is it so different and open-ended however that in fact very little that is new for the students comes from the philosophy lesson? The criticism seems easy to make that too often no progress in learning is generated in a community of inquiry. Are we just going round in circles, sharing what we know and reinforcing dominant paradigms?
This problem of the dialogue's open-endedness becomes acute when we face the task of writing up units and courses in philosophy for children in the new Queensland Outcomes frameworks. No longer will the now-discarded descriptors or behavioural objectives suffice to describe standard processes. Now we focus on observable outcomes to achieve in courses and lesson sequences; curriculum planning today is focused on achievable and realisable outcomes. Outcomes build on outcomes. If those outcomes are not definable and describable, then our effort to incorporate philosophy into the secondary curriculum may be fraught with setbacks. Let's not confuse open-endedness with no direction.
Learners bring expectations and already established histories of learning (and turnoffs too!) I have in mind my own busy and seasoned Year 9 and 10 boys who are reluctant to trust a method that relies so much on talk alone. They are looking for familiar paradigms or existing frameworks compatible with the rest of the curriculum. They too readily presume that talk is easy, "a pushover" or a mere manipulation of views. They are themselves overwhelmed in an ocean of words in the media and on the 'net, and believe that anything can be woven from anything. They are overwhelmed by words, ideas, manipulative voices, exploitative agents and a plethora of choices. They suspect "the disposition of curiosity and the open mind" so espoused by Splitter and Sharp (1995:141). Any display of 'scholarly ignorance' or a "self-conscious display of genuine curiosity and puzzlement" (Whitehead 1929:37, Reed, 1992:150, Splitter and Sharp, 1995:140) such as in Socratic dialogue is met with defensiveness and suspicion. Since "neither the content nor the direction of philosophical inquiry can be predetermined" (143), it appears to them that talk is time-out from real learning and is merely highly subjective. Without quantitative end of unit tests, the Philosophy subject looks like it will never yield transportable "progress in learning," but only more conflicting subjective opinions in an already confusing and confused adolescent universe. They may be right; however we argue for 'dialogue', a wholly different concept.
I am responding to Susan Gardner's comments (1991:41-49) where she writes, "the facilitator must be encouraged to push for more in-depth thinking" to lead the students "not only to justify their answers but to justify their justifications." She observes the usefulness of community of inquiry programs is to induce students to think, and urges that teachers "ensure they are merciless in insisting that students be prepared to lay bare the thought process behind what they say." The teacher must "retain focus . . . to track truth" (46). This last phrase is particularly challenging and seems to require that teachers are the ultimate arbiters of veracity. This built-up attitude seems to confuse pedagogical action with a philosophical process. But again, much of her concern seems to be for the content of dialogue or what we could call 'epistemic gains', rather than for developing competence in process, attitudes and dispositions supporting rigorous inquiry. But community of inquiry is not entirely focused on reaching knowledge gains as outcomes of learning, or even identifying the stages of success in learning. It has a fourfold purpose.
With more respect for the processes, Susan Haack (2002:417) admits that "inquiry is often untidy, inconclusive, and biased by the inquirers' interests." She argues that we need not settle for epistemic relativism however, saying that inquiry can be global and unconventional (by which I think she means that there are holistic, non-linear ways of establishing truth), and that it can break free of the mythical identifications that are tempting with young children. Yet a variability of criteria for truth does not imply a relativity of standards (428) for attaining it. Are we teachers then caught in a cleft stick: avoiding both the Scylla of the too-hard-to-teach foundationalism path to truth and the Charybdis of messy coherentism? One might even be tempted to typecast this dilemma as an irreconcilable dichotomy between the linear and logical 'masculine' versus the spiraling, ebb and flow of 'feminine' theories of knowledge. Such a depiction is unhelpful and subjective; we just need to be clearer about our methodology for making progress towards knowledge.
Level I trainers face similar problems in urging teachers to 'let go,' to follow the inquiry wherever it leads. Secondary teachers especially are trained to achieve 'outcomes' in lessons and thereby judge the success of a lesson upon whether students can perform what is taught. Competence in learning with right answers closes discussions and establishes a teacher's authority with superior knowledge. In subject-based classes in a crowded curriculum, alternative perspectives can seldom be explored or given enough space or scope for discussion. One exercise in foundationalism is Socratic dialogue which demonstrates that dialogue can be directional, such as occurs when Socrates pursues the idea of virtue in the Meno. Such dialogue that moves insistently and certainly towards observable outcomes. Such dialogue is not just a process of constant clarification or a discussion about word meanings, but an directional inquiry to reach a viable and workable definition, or indeed to show the very real difficulties along the way. It may meander in ebb and flow, but nonetheless intensive dialogue generates a satisfaction that all major objections, misunderstandings and metaphors have been unmasked.
But this focused dialectic of Socratic dialogue is not the community of inquiry we generally practise. Laurence BonJour's (2002:390) coherence theory of knowledge as being very helpful in this regard. He offers an alternative methodology to the linear regress of justification which the community of inquiry is not designed to do nor has little possibility of achieving. He holds that "beliefs are justified by being inferentially related to other beliefs in the overall context of a coherent system"(391) Most philosophical focus is on the local level of justification, but a global level of justification can be achieved from the "inferability from other beliefs in my overall system of beliefs."(393) This is not achieved without rigour however: "a user of that system must make a reasonable effort to seek out relevant, possibly conflicting observations, if his beliefs are to be justified" (396). I would expect that this necessary plurality of competing sets of claims for the truth at that time would arise in the community of inquiry, for in the longer term, it strives for a "holism which is part and parcel of [any] coherence theory" (397). I would describe such a community, to use his words, as a "dynamic coherence of an ongoing system of beliefs which someone actually accepts" (398). Our discussions are both procedural and substantive; if we are clear about our substantive direction such as establishing coherence among claims, our procedural moves can be more easily justified and useful.
Towards A Reply
Answers to these challenges come on different fronts. First functionally, we should realise that not all classroom lessons reveal something new for everyone. Much learning there is incrementally controlled. Some lessons are repetitions to achieve excellence in performance. Epistemologically, one answer is that dialogue is group inquiry, producing knowledge that is validated by group scrutiny and persistent inquiry; it is a knowledge that emerges as true for being tested, refined and affirmed. A focus on knowledge-outcomes alone from the community of inquiry comes from a limited objectivist perspective rather than from a holistic view; for community of inquiry teachers value not just what is learned but how the learner feels, how the learner values the learning; that is equally important in community of inquiry. Its locus is learning not necessarily knowledge, its agents are learners and knowers, and its purpose is to learn many things, skills, attitudes and dispositions. Learning here is more than the collection of facts; it also requires an assimilation of views. It is formative too in that it includes a degree of pleasure in achievement, so that the learner will want to learn again. In short, learning is attitudinal too.
Identifying of the inquiry's purpose as singularly to generate knowledge alone misses its point. It is a philosophical inquiry because it is not concerned with the production of knowledge but with the appreciation, analysis and evaluation of it. It is primarily concerned not with data but with analysis, not necessarily with content but with processes for recognising what is true. Hence community of inquiry ranges over what is quantifiable and what is qualitative, from critical analysis to holistic evaluation, from stark principles to appreciating applications in contexts, from the text to the reader, and from propositional truth to personal truths. The question presumes there is more value in revealing some objective knowledge than from monitoring our processes in constructing it. Content-only outcomes pose a false division that foolishly tries to delineate philosophy from education, as a simple distinction between content and process.
One criterion for recognising 'progress in learning' in the community of inquiry is often a pragmatic one about finding content. It is quite satisfactory to hold that 'what is new' could be new only within the limited experience of some students, not new as in a world-shattering discovery. To reinvent a known process, or to grapple with classic conundrums is progress too and can be valuable learning. The history of science records how major breakthroughs occurring nearly simultaneously in vastly different places had no less value for being real discoveries. Progress in learning in the community of inquiry could well be a discovery of knowledge already available in the adult universe.
Progress in learning also comes as process. Sharing understandings, articulating new perspectives on familiar things, events and terms may be a great outcome from the community of inquiry and so rate as progress in learning. Pushing the categories, revealing assumptions, making inferences and reaching conclusions must rate as 'progress in learning' too. The community of inquiry may well become a neat exchange of old understandings for new ones because participants change their minds. Bit it would seldom be a neat exchange of new for old for all. It is envisaged that the whole group pursues an inquiry to reach new understandings for itself as a group. Discoveries for an individual more usually rate as "new for me" knowledge. Such personal discoveries are significant too, for they affirm the self as a learner and even for seeing oneself growing into philosophy. Polya clearly broke this object-oriented spell in his explanation of learning as a process.1 Thus, as practitioners of the art of inquiry, we teachers in communities of inquiry realise that we are also engaged in the formative process of engendering new identities as learners.
Progress in learning can be identified as experience using epistemic processes, that is, being aware of using philosophical processes, such as in making connections, constructing meaningful associations, defining the meanings of concepts or in concept building. Progress in learning could appear as a reconstellation of ideas, in an ordering of formerly chaotic experiences, in an experience of seeing things from new perspectives, or in a new look at reality. An insight of significance is "progress in learning." A rearrangement of emotional signposts can constitute progress in learning. A systematic identification of contextual markers such as in seeing stages in history, or in plotting the history of an idea such as "Human Progress" constitutes progress in learning. Progress in learning in the philosophy classroom can appear in understanding new ideas, as well as in a growing competence and confidence in using philosophical processes.
Progress in learning also comes as competencies and skills, such as in an increased confidence to speak or in an increased awareness of one's competence at articulating concepts or helping others make connections. Golding (2002: 13) lists some thirteen skills that mark progress in learning. Thus, progress in learning appears as growths in process mastery; Lipman (1984:52) reassures us that such skill development will be a gradual but comprehensive process:
"Gradually the children will come to discover inconsistencies in their own thinking . . . They (will) learn to cooperate by building on one another's ideas, by questioning each others' underlying assumptions, by suggesting alternatives when some find themselves blocked and frustrated, and by listening carefully and respectfully to the ways in which other people express how things appear to them."
Progress in learning also comes as emotional outcomes of self awareness, in epistemic awareness. This is affectivity in a new-found competence in caring, in supporting others who are hesitant or less able to find evidence, or who are singularly sticking to their view when it requires the courage to let go.
Progress in learning is also attitudinal; it comes with valuing personal efforts to make meaning, in learning to practise desirable epistemic dispositions. Philosophy in the community of inquiry strives to engender desirable attitudes: like engagement, persistence, commitment to pursue the truth, a predisposition for reasonableness, the habit of reflection, and the desire for self knowledge. It initiates and enhances the human search for and the use of explicit social values in the conduct of a reasonable life and in the exercise of wisdom.
Progress in learning in the community of inquiry can be a sense of discovery, or of reaching a breakthrough, and comes as:
If community of inquiry in an educational context is constructing knowledge that is worthwhile, how is such knowledge recorded? How will community of inquiry avoid the charge that it generates knowledge that is temporary, of only passing interest and value? Knowledge in the community firstly is shared in the memories of the individual and of the group. It can be recalled and applied in other situations. It can be accessed too by the group as part of its on-going identity and shared memory when it reconvenes. Knowledge reached in the community of inquiry can be recorded mechanically on a tape recorder or in notes taken by others present in the room,such as adult colleagues, trainee teachers or visiting parents. Furthermore, knowledge generated in the community will be recorded by the diligent teacher-practitioner who takes notes or draws a concept map on the whiteboard while discussion is in progress, or who recalls whatever salient points of discussion were arrived at very soon afterwards in a personal journal of reflection and evaluation of each class. That kind of progress in learning is recordable and available as real outcomes such advanced conceptualisation, greater facility with complexities, more frequent self correction, more mutual respect, and a greater use of reasonableness.
Since knowledge is relative to times, places and persons, it could be argued, that community of inquiry knowledge is a "knowledge of affirmation," a knowledge that retains a personal aura, a knowledge from insight and feelings, a knowledge different from data in the scientific scene. Knowledge of this kind triangulates perceptions, feelings, observations and convictions with facts and data to become owned and prized as 'our' knowledge, much in the way described by Polanyi (1964) as personal knowledge, in his theory of tacit knowing which makes an important distinction between perceptual and conceptual knowledge. Such knowledge is still epistemologically sound, for it underpins the possibility of having group scrutiny. Lastly, it could be noted that community of inquiry nurtures an abiding self-critical disposition. Its starting points will reside in the texts selected (the press article, narrative, axiom, symbol or video used to begin discussion), and the end points will reside in the propositions affirmed or kept in abeyance for future examination. Being tentative, relative, opinionative or ephemeral like many schoolroom learning, it could suffer lapses in epistemology, distortions in presentation and silences about contexts. Closure is usually reached when all posed questions are reasonably well answered to everyone's satisfaction. Such progress in learning in the community of inquiry is compelling knowledge for it is reached and owned by the group inquiry processes. Such dialogue can generate compelling knowledge (Solberg, 1997), ["Solberg describes the movement from lived experience to "compelling knowledge" as seeing what is the case, recognizing one's implication in it, and responding accountably."]2 or finding satisfactory explanations and answers that have cogency.
Status of Inquiry Outcomes
In defining progress in learning not as data or facts but as processes, we seem to inhibit any criticism of it at all. Is there any measure of success or failure in the community of inquiry? Is it called successful if any particular session did not produce any "progress in learning"? It could be envisaged that at the expiry of the allocated time, the students had merely reiterated anecdotes without reflecting upon them or failed to pose new questions. Would that not then be just a mere conversation in its circularity of notional agreements? An answer lies in defining progress in learning as both information and skill development. Splitter and Sharp (152) speak of a double aspect of inquiry, that is, the strategy of attending to the subject matter at hand then weaving in a reflective dimension. They observe that reflective processes are part and parcel of the learning process, that "creative and imaginative thinking are 'fruits of doing philosophy'" (157). The posing of new questions would seem to be but one real sign of progress.
Progress in learning too is usually gained incrementally; it takes time to recognise progress. One way to describe our distinctive pedagogy is to see the living process as a group story in progress. In a published paper, (Analytic Teaching 1995), I described the classroom community of inquiry as a growing story about ourselves. There I referred to the class group as having an identity in a developing narrative, which reconvenes as a community with already developed networks, a history and a learned set of roles and acceptable behaviours. It is identifiable as 'our' distinctive community that has learned enough of the values of respect, reasonableness and self-correction to be able to operate as a community of inquiry. For Jardine and Clandinin (1987: 478), viewing teaching as storytelling does not orient towards control, prediction and manipulation of views but towards giving a voice to the emergent shared meaning arising for teacher and students. "This emergent sense of meaning, in which both teacher and children are part of the on-going narrative of the classroom, is what we mean by teaching as storytelling." Kieran Egan (1988:3) too stresses the power of children's imaginations and the need for more adequate lessons such as reading stories to educe meaningful learning. Christine Gehrett (1997:20) noted that "narrative is a tool for understanding ourselves and how we came to be the way we are, . . . a means of gaining control over our destiny." As the group narrative grows, so does the learning.
In this model, the teacher stands in the story as but one teller, as part of the community, part of the fate of the class, which is in progress and an agent in its development. Thus, the teacher stands as an epistemic agent, one with more experience and some more specific skills that the story needs. Nonetheless, each student has a part to play as well. It is within the bounds of this metaphor to say that within the community of inquiry, "each child is attempting to give voice to his or her story" (479) on a journey decided upon by its participants.
The classic production of knowledge could be characterised as having three moments. At the first level ("the first generality" in Louis Althusser's framework )3 the raw data is identified. The second is the working on these data to produce a body or determinate system of concepts that determine a specific domain. Out of this working on the first generality emerges a thought-product, a specific, concrete, scientific (if you will) theory which can be called "the third generality." To summarise, this is a three-step production, identification of the facts or data, the generation of concepts and connections, and the development of a theory to explain or contain these concepts or data. This theory is generated by the operation of the second generality on the first, when the theory is tested against the data.
A similar self-checking, recursive dynamic is working in community of inquiry discussions: observations and questions arise from an encounter with the text; these are sorted as empirical, textual, psychological or philosophical and are treated accordingly as already discussed. Key concepts are identified (if necessary by the teacher, a key epistemic agent over a sequence of lessons); this is the second generality of the production of knowledge. Further discussion strives to clarify, connect and organise these concepts. The more mature a community of inquiry is the greater are its chances of reaching that third generality where a theory is proposed using those new concepts and is tested against the data. It is possible that some groups may pass beyond the second generality to establish identifiable outcomes to make "progress in learning." We may sometimes hear imaginative suppositions, creative intimations, and inspired guesses as explanations, but community of inquiry is designed and does have the inherent capacity to make progress in learning through these stages. It does indeed have an epistemic purpose and a satisfactory epistemic process.
An heuristic, experimental pedagogy
Art Costa (1991: 211) reminds us of the power of heuristic learning. Whenever this community is reconstituted, this living narrative can build on already developed strengths, draw on a collective memory, continue to value key individuals, and extend its care and concern for members who seldom speak, and towards those who listen insightfully. In this rich matrix of behaviours, dispositions and self-corrections, the teacher's role as modeler of important reinforcing behaviours is paramount. With his or her help, the group can define its sense of direction in inquiry, identify markers of progress along the way (Smith, 2000), and, more pertinently for our discussion here, the teacher must be the one to recognise, and acknowledge the arrival of what we can now call 'progress in learning.'
In the light of this discussion, we could note that doing philosophy in the community of inquiry is experimental. Ours is an heuristic pedagogy, for it experiments and tests; the community thinks in an as-if fashion at times and imagines possibilities that are novel. It dares to think differently: preeminently, children are willing to play with possibilities and hypotheticals, and so we can speak of the inquiry's tentative, relative, partial and hypothetical character. This 'heuristic pedagogy' is designed to search for what it finds convincing and persuasive; it is not however just fantasy or play or "time out." We teachers must be heard to assume that there is something to find out in it, that the inquiry will have interim successes, and that if imagined possibilities fail, others may succeed. An heuristic pedagogy will not necessarily be focused on outcomes but will be monitoring the search, plotting the process along the way. Its subject matter is whatever the community is currently dealing with at the time as the focus of its inquiry, and so clearly, outcomes cannot be predetermined or definable until they are achieved. Talking this way, we alert ourselves to its conditional status in what Robert Audi (Heumer, 2002:8) calls adverbial knowledge.
As an heuristic pedagogy, community of inquiry is constructivist because it attempts to articulate concepts from a variety of sources in the students' experiences. Being creative too at times, this heuristic approach is rich in endless possibilities and necessarily pluralistic in outcomes. It will be partial and inadequate at times, employing only likely accounts and awkward metaphors in its tentative attempts to uncover meaning or define concepts. This is a philosophy of risk, in its threshing out of nonsense from truths. But it may well be that only here in the curriculum are ideas given a chance to prove themselves, or indeed suffer disqualification. The community of inquiry as an heuristic pedagogy is not a closed circle of mutual admiration or mirror maze of self reinforcing biases, but by its very experimental nature, is a medium for finding out something, for delivering outcomes of the why and how kind. This is its unique status among the school subjects on offer. Because it is heuristic and experimental, it is then fair to say that in it we can make progress to reach a reasonably well examined set of understandings within the framework of the students' nominated questions.
Conclusion
Our discussion has outlined issues to do with just one problem in the conduct of the community of inquiry, whether it constructs progress in learning. It arises from a current need when philosophy tries to lay out its content in the Outcomes boxes in school syllabuses. The question arises naturally, as most of our training is directed at skills development perhaps at the expense of content. The very nature of the community of inquiry's very open-endedness makes this discussion issue understandable, where neither the content nor the direction of inquiry can be predetermined.
Our reply comes in terms of developing the answer that progress in learning appears in four forms, content (data), skills, attitudes and affectivity. We respect the knowledge our students bring; they are important starting points for development. We also reply that knowing how is often better that knowing that. In short, we say that how the learner feels, and what the learner values in the content, process, and environment of learning is a more holistic analysis of what we do. We reasserted that we are in the business of engendering genuine puzzlement with guided curiosity. Outcomes of worthwhile learning will appear within these four areas.
The paper has provided a locus and discourse towards formulating an epistemology of the community of inquiry by discussing the nature, sources and limits of its capacity to verify knowledge. We discussed its processes for dealing with observations, beliefs and judgments, and proposed some criteria for distinguishing beliefs from knowledge. We showed how community of inquiry favours coherentism rather than foundationalism as its preferred methodology. It highlighted the teacher's key role as an epistemic agent in its conduct, although we disagreed with Susan Gardner's requirement on her to "track the truth."4 We offered some observations on desirable epistemic dispositions for participating in a community of inquiry.
We established that a community of inquiry's philosophical outcomes are identifiable yet not necessarily predictable. The community of inquiry is best when it shares a sense of its own progress as an inquiry. With some more sure awareness of its purposes and dynamics, we teacher practitioners prize those mega-questions among the many that students pose. We ride the necessary tradeoffs between these four focuses for 'progress in learning' at different stages in the development of the community for the sake of that community's growth and coherence. We explored the new ideas of heuristic pedagogy and the 'knowledge of affirmation' as important traits of the group narrative participants construct in the unique and rather experimental environment that is the community of inquiry. That the community does make 'progress in learning' cannot be denied if that term is understood in this fourfold way. #
1. For Polya on concrete interpretations and applications, see: http://www.cut-the-knot.com/Mset99/examples.shtml#polya2
2. M. M. Solberg: The amazon.com.blurb for her book.
3. Louis Althusser's presentation of the process of theory formation, see especially For Marx (New York: Schocken, 1979) Ch. 4, n 3; Reading Capital 40-43 (New York: Schocken, 1979); and Lenin and Philosophy 60-63 (New York: Monthly Review 1971).
4. Susan Gardner: "[Since] a goal that can only be reached through the efforts of the participants, she may be able to facilitate the tracking of truth." [On-line] Available: home.pacific.net.au/~greg.hub/notjustconversation.html#track
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